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OVERVIEW
• Why is investment important?
• Some terminology
• What’s special about electricity investment?
• Reminder about centralised investment planning
• Brief look at capacity schemes
• Capacity schemes and structural solutions compared
• New Zealand’s position appraised
• Presentation draws on:
R. Meade, “Electricity Investment and Security of Supply in
Liberalized Electricity Systems,” in Mielczarski, W. (ed), 2005,
Development of Electricity Markets, Technical University of Lodz
(downloadable from www.iscr.org.nz)
• Presages imminent release of:
L. Evans and R. Meade, 2005, Alternating Currents or Counter-
Revolution? Contemporary Electricity Reform in New Zealand,
Victoria University Press (in press)
OVERVIEW – Cont’d
• Because liberalised electricity systems emphasise:
– Decentralised decision-making
– Market-driven investment choices
– Investment risks being shouldered by investors
• Because the timing, level and type of investment
affects:
– The balance of supply and demand, and hence
– The level, course and volatility of electricity prices
• Together these affect “security of supply,” and the
politics thereof (in turn affecting investment …)
WHY IS INVESTMENT IMPORTANT?
• Important to distinguish security and adequacy
• Following Oren (2000) et al.:
– Security – “ability of the system to withstand sudden
disturbances”
– Adequacy (aka “security of supply”) – “ability of the system to
supply the aggregate electric power and energy requirements
of the consumers at all times”
• This presentation focuses on the broader adequacy
TERMINOLOGY
• Established theory of peak pricing commonly predicts that
competitive, energy-only electricity markets are sufficient to elicit
the optimal level of investment, with prices
– Reflecting marginal operating costs off-peak
– Also covering capacity costs at peak!
• Optimal investment equates the marginal social benefit of
avoiding unmet demand and the marginal social cost of supply
→ non-zero rationing can be optimal!
• Theory emphasises importance of the “scarcity rent” component
in peak prices for funding peaking plant → beware price caps!
• But don’t we need interventions when markets “fail” …?
ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT RESULT
• The usually-cited culprits:
– Real-time balance required due to non-storability
– Actions of one grid-connected party affects other parties
– Selective demand curtailment is tricky
– Physical and contractual electricity flows needn’t coincide
• Other possible suspects:
– Inelastic demand
– Inelastic supply
– Oligopolistic competition
– Illiquid forward energy trading
– Electricity markets are immature/evolving, and participants are
inexperienced
– Regulation (e.g. price caps) to limit market power harm investment
ELECTRICITY INVESTMENT QUIRKS
Volatile and spiky spot prices
• More promising candidates – other types of “market failure”:
– Security of supply is a public good
– Security of supply involves externalities
• On market under-provision due to public good features:
– Definition requires non-exclusion, non-exhaustion and non-rejection
– But security of supply is exhaustible → CPR (Ostrom (2000))
– Real issue is ability to secure revenue for security provision
• On public vs private benefits/costs (externalities):
– Spot electricity prices incompletely internalise benefits/costs
– But externalities are commonplace – are these ones material? (or the
costs of remedying them even worse?)
• Diseconomies of scale and scope and information costs from reform
INVESTMENT QUIRKS – Cont’d
• Sinclair Knight Mertz (2003):
“Development is proceeding on an ad hoc basis. We do not know which
schemes are the most beneficial to New Zealand as a whole and hence
we cannot be sure that the most beneficial schemes are being
developed.”
• But Galvin’s (1985) review of New Zealand investment planning:
– Systematic and gross over-estimates of demand growth
– Over-investment, commissioning delays, and cost over-runs
– Political pricing (with significant, periodic corrections)
– Still had blackouts
• Has the leopard changed its spots?
CENTRALISED INVESTMENT REVISITED
• Price-based mechanisms, aka:
– Capacity payments
– Operating reserves
• Quantity-based mechanisms, aka:
– Planning reserves
– Operating reserves
– Installed capacity markets (ICAPs)
– Capacity requirements/obligations
• Other schemes:
– Options-based
– Capacity subscriptions with load-limiting devices (Doorman (2003))
Where markets involve price caps, such schemes can be necessary
(but are not always sufficient) to ensure adequacy
CAPACITY SCHEMES IN BRIEF
• The good news:
– Absent market power, and if demand is 100% price inelastic, these
schemes can induce the same given level of adequacy as energy-
only markets, but with smoother prices and generator profits, and
lower price caps
– Under certain conditions capacity schemes maximise social welfare
• The bad news:
– Implementation problems risk welfare losses
– Eliminating rationing altogether is too socially costly
– Generator market power just jumps markets, producing same
outcomes as in energy-only markets
– TSO capacity contracting crowds out private peaking investments
– Price suppression and crowding out mean schemes become self-
perpetuating
Just another artificial and fallible quasi-market?
CAPACITY SCHEMES – Cont’d
MARKET POWER AND ADEQUACY
Market Power
Higher InvestmentHigher Prices
Lower Demand Better Adequacy
Improved adequacy in turn constrains market power
PRICE CAPS & CAPACITY MECHANISMS
Market Power
Regulatory Risk
Lower Investment
Price Caps
Capacity Schemes
Make-up Investment
Lower Prices
Higher Demand
Worse Adequacy Better Adequacy Worse Adequacy
Worse Adequacy
Lower Investment
NEW ZEALAND AT PRESENT
Dry-Year Risk
Regulatory Risk
Lower Investment
Partial “Price Cap”?
Capacity Schemes
Lower Investment?
Lower Prices?
Higher Demand?
Worse Adequacy
Worse Adequacy?
Worse Adequacy?
Whirinaki Reserve
Generation Scheme
Better Adequacy?
STABLE STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVE?
Less Regulatory Risk
Less Market Power
No Price Caps
Regulatory Restraint Vertical Integration Improved D-Side
Higher Investment
Better AdequacyParsimonious and self-reinforcing
• Holy grail for many is the widespread introduction of
real-time pricing
• RTP is only first-best where consumers are risk
neutral, which seems unlikely given common
customer preference for hedging (plus small
household spend)
• Development of power exchanges for successively
smaller customers likely to be important (tap upside)
• Capacity subscriptions with LLDs worth a good look
ON IMPROVING THE DEMAND SIDE
• A bob neither way, or central planning “lite”? – partial price cap, but
limited reserve generation, and no general capacity scheme
• “Activist government,” and Electricity Commission with widening
regulatory discretions – you think demand forecasting is hard?
• Politicisation of generation technology choice, and moral hazard
created by government sabre-rattling
• SOE investments compete, but questions re sub-market
investment returns, and ad hoc, non-contested Genesis gas risks
underwrite
• Regulation of forward contracting at expense of vertical integration
• Inevitable and bumpy slide to increasing state dominance of future
generation investment?
NEW ZEALAND’S ARRANGEMENTS
Thank you – any questions?
